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Abstract—This paper studies strategic conflict resolution
for air traffic based on sum coloring. We consider two
application scenarios: manned and unmanned air traffic, with
similar targets: to improve efficiency of operations and to
reduce the costs. For the Unmanned Air Vehicles Traffic
Management (UTM) we consider also a payment mechanism
which incentivizes the operators to share information nec-
essary to find a socially optimal solution. We quantify the
potential savings via a series of experiments, showing that
our methods drastically outperform the widely used First-
Come-First-Serve (FCFS) strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict resolution is of critical importance in aviation.
Current Air Traffic Management (ATM) needs improve-
ments to face the expected traffic growth, in particular
to alleviate the air traffic controllers workload and to
avoid the unnecessary costs of solving conflicts that
could have been anticipated. In unmanned aviation, the
issue is different: drones are expected to do numerous
short flights, requiring a higher level of automation to
solve conflicts.
In both ATM and UTM, aircraft operators (airlines
or drone owners) submit flight plans with a planned
trajectory for each flight [1]. Considering the flight plans
of aircraft crossing the same airspace in the same time
window, it is possible to anticipate the conflicts and to
provide strategic deconfliction, with a reduction of the
operators costs.
In this paper, we study how to do the conflict resolu-
tion in an optimal way. Our solution involves allocating
resources to aircraft to solve the conflicts (time slots in
the ATM case, flight levels in the UTM case). We model
finding optimal resource allocation as a weighted sum
coloring problem.
• For manned aviation, we consider a standard setting
where too many airplanes want to cross a sector
at the same time, leading to the sector overload.
When it is detected, ground holding cannot be
applied to the planes that already took off, and the
congestion creates airborne delays. There may be,
however, enough time to organize the crossing of
the airspace in a cost-saving way. We show how to
resolve the airspace overload with an optimal time
slot allocation, considering the trade-offs between
two criteria: total delay time and total delay cost.
• For unmanned aviation, we study the case of a
centralized system that uses vertical layers to avoid
conflicts between drones [2], [3]. We show how to
find a solution that optimizes the social cost (the
total operating cost); the agent-based strategic de-
confliction is achieved with an economic mechanism
for capacity management.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
reviews related work. In Sections III and IV we explain
the Minimum Sum Coloring Problem (MSCP) and how
optimizing the deconfliction can be modeled as MSCP.
Section V describes the experimental setup. In Section VI
we present our results, and in Section VII we describe
the payment mechanism.
II. RELATED WORK
Currently, the European traffic is optimized by The
European Network Manager Operations Centre (NMOC)
[4]. When an en-route sector is overloaded, three strate-
gies are used by the NMOC: ground holding, rerouting
and metering. The goal of these strategies is to minimize
the delays, the financial loss and the environmental
impact of the congestion. The SESAR Undertaking seeks
to improve future operations with new concepts for
ATM optimization. Several strategies are explored to
provide en-route deconfliction, for instance, with a better
ground holding, flight level allocation and the assign-
ment of alternative trajectories. In [5], a new ground
holding approach is presented, where all potential con-
flicts occurring above a given flight level are solved
assuming aircraft can precisely follow their planned
4D-trajectories. Adjustments in the departure times are
imposed in order to avoid the conflicts; however, for
busy days solving all conflicts with ground delays can be
too costly. Furthermore, the authors present an approach
to account for uncertainties, which unfortunately results
in high delays. In [6], flight level allocation is proposed
to solve en-route conflicts; results show that the global
conflict resolution workload could be alleviated by at
least 20%. In [7], a combination of both ground holding
and flight level allocation is presented; still, uncertainties
are not taken into account. Finally, in [8], a route-slot allo-
cation technique is used in order to minimize the number
of potential conflicts between aircraft by modifying the
shape of their trajectories and by shifting their departure
times.
On the other hand, even though the drone industry is
still in an early stage, it is already a hot topic. A lot of
practical applications for drones are currently contem-
plated, and their presence in city is expected to grow
rapidly in the future. Several risks have been assessed
as a consequence of this development, such as collisions
between aircraft and the risks linked to flying over
people. UTM will be necessary to ensure that drones are
operated with safety. According to the European ATM
Master Plan [9], the deployment of drones is likely to
be supported by the emergence of new business models
and service providers. In this article, we focus on the
case of drones in-town flights at a low altitude (under
500 ft above ground level, to be separated from manned
traffic).
The future air transportation system comes with the
challenge of establishing the ”right” rules for pricing
ATM services and auctioning available resources. Mech-
anism design is needed to drive the market, and several
papers presented allocation and pricing mechanism for
ATM applications [10]–[12].
The question of deconfliction via auctions arises in
UTM as well [13]. In particular, limits to traffic density
may be enforced in the U3 phase of U-Space deployment
[9], where the dynamic capacity management may be im-
plemented for various reasons (e.g., noise ”overdose”).
Here again, flight prioritization ensuring equitable allo-
cation of airspace resources may be done via economic
mechanisms.
III. MINIMUM SUM COLORING PROBLEM
Given an undirected graph G = (V, E) where V is
the set of vertices and E ⊂ V2 is the set of edges,
graph vertex coloring involves assigning a color to each
vertex so that two adjacent vertices (linked by an edge)
feature different colors. An equivalent formulation is to
consider a coloring as a partition of G into subsets of
vertices so that two adjacent vertices do not belong to
the same subset [14]. Graph coloring has many different
applications, such as in scheduling or register allocation
problems, where, for instance, a set of jobs need to be
assigned to time slots, assigning one slot to each job to
avoid conflicts [15].
The Graph Vertex Coloring Problem is finding the
minimum number of colors (or the minimum number
of subsets) needed to color the graph. The Minimum
Sum Coloring Problem (MSCP) is a variant of the graph
Fig. 1. Example for MSCP from Jin and Hao 2016 [16]. The left coloring
uses 3 colors (which is the optimal coloring) and its sum of colors is
18. The right coloring uses one more color but its sum of colors is 15
(which is optimal)
vertex coloring, in which each color is identified with a
positive integer, called the cost of the color, and the goal
is to minimize the total cost (Figure 1).
Given a coloring C : V 7→ N, we define S(C) =
∑v∈V cv as the sum of the colors assigned to the vertices
(cv = C(v)). The optimal sum of colors is called the
chromatic sum of G. Both the vanilla coloring problem
and the MSCP are NP-hard [17].
IV. MODELING DECONFLICTION AS WEIGHTED MSCP
In the input to our problem we have a set of planes
entering an en-route sector at the same time slot, with
a 4-D trajectory assigned to each plane. Two planes are
in conflict if following their trajectories would lead to a
loss of separation. Once we have detected the conflicts,
we build a graph G = (V, E) on the planes: the planes
are the vertices V and conflicts between planes are
represented by the edges E. For unmanned aviation,
we are given trajectories of drones over a city area and
create the conflict graph G in a similar way (drones are
vertices and the conflicts are represented by edges). To
solve the conflicts, we assign colors to the aircraft (the
colors represent time slots for planes and vertical layers
for drones). With this interpretation, solving conflicts
becomes a graph coloring problem: vertices connected
by an edge cannot be assigned the same color (otherwise
we get a conflict). Furthermore, to optimize the conflict
resolution, we want to find a coloring with good prop-
erties.
Note that in the standard coloring, all colors have
equal value, while in our setting the users have pref-
erences over colors. For instance, in the slot assignment,
the first time slot is most desirable. In layer assignment,
the layers may have different values e.g., due to different
speeds a drone can attain in different layers (because of
the winds or possible speed limits for layers closer to
the ground imposed for safety reasons). To account for
this difference we use sum coloring (instead of the usual
coloring) to model optimization of conflict resolution.
Specifically, we assume that assigning a color to the
aircraft v ∈ V creates a cost for the operator of v. We
identify the colors with their costs, so that cv is the cost
incurred by v in the coloring C. In particular, in the time
slot assignment, cv will represent the delay. Minimizing





Furthermore, different users have different value of
time (e.g., due to the number of passengers and/or fuel
consumption rate). To take this into account, we consider
the weighted version of MSCP, where each aircraft v has
a weight wv. In the weighted version, the objective is to




We use the same formula for the total cost of the layer
assignment in UTM, with cv representing the cost of the
layer assigned to the drone v and wv representing the
weight (value) given by the drone operator to the flight.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
For manned aviation we used traffic files from EU-
ROCONTROL’s Demand Data Repository (DDR2) [18].
For UTM, we used simulated flights over a metropolitan
area. More details are given in the following sections.
A. ATM Trajectory Data
From the historical data we obtained the information
about the planes that flew inside the LOCCAOI sector
(above Germany) during one hour (Figure 2). To simu-
late the congestion (i.e., the situation when the planes
want to use the airspace at the same time) we forced all
planes to enter the sector at the same time, delaying or
advancing the time in the flight plans accordingly. Then,
we detected the conflicts between the aircraft trajectories
and built the graph G.
B. Weights for Manned Aviation
The financial values of time were used as weights for
the sum coloring. These values were obtained from [19],
where values for the cost of delay for European airlines
are computed for several aircraft models. Strategic and
tactical costs of delay are considered in the document,
and also 3 scenarios: low, base and high. In our case, we
used the strategic cost of delay and the base scenario. As
all the aircraft are in the en-route phase, the fuel costs
will represent the major source of cost. Note that only
15 aircraft models are considered in the reference doc-
ument; for those aircraft for which no data is provided
the cost of delay of an equivalent aircraft in terms of
dimensions and performance (and included in [19]) is
used. Figure 3 shows a table with the en-route strategic
costs for the 3 scenarios and for the 15 aircraft models.
Fig. 2. Traffic sample flying inside LOCCAOI sector visualized with
NEST
Fig. 3. En-route total strategic costs in euros per hour [19]
C. Drone Data
We used the Cal model [20] to simulate drone flights
over Norrko¨ping municipality in Sweden. The model is
stochastic: the drones have randomly generated depar-
ture and arrival, with a higher probability to be located
in more densely populated area. For our experiments,
we simulated the traffic over one hour. We varied the
number of drones from 100 to 5000. We assigned random
weights to the drones assuming that the majority will
have small weights (where delay does not create high
cost), while some have very high weights (for which
punctuality is critical).
VI. RESULTS
This section reports the results of experimenting with
the above model on manned and unmanned traffic.
In particular, we compare our results with First Come
First Served (FCFS) deconfliction. We used an integer
programming (IP) formulation of MSCP, specifically a
weighted version of the ”compact formulation” [21]. This
formulation introduces decision variables Xvc associated








Xvc = 1 ∀v ∈ V (4)
Xic + Xjc ≤ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ E, ∀c ∈N (5)
Xvc ∈ {0, 1} ∀v ∈ V, ∀c ∈N (6)
We solved our IPs using Gurobi on a server with
two Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6132 2.60GHz CPU nodes, 64
RAM and 2.59 TB temporary disk space.
For ATM, we ran experiments on two test cases:
• ATM Case 1: on June 2nd, 2018 from 12am to 1pm,
with V = 450 planes (vertices) and E = 1399
conflicts (edges), and
• ATM Case 2: on June 6th, 2018 from 12am to 1pm
with V = 462 and E = 770.
For UTM, we also considered two test cases:
• UTM Case 1: with V = 800 drones and E = 663
edges, and
• UTM Case 2: with V = 1000 and E = 770.
In all cases finding the optimal IP solution in one
instance completed within few minutes.
As discussed above, for the manned aviation the al-
location has two objectives – minimizing the total delay
and minimizing the total cost. The delay minimization is
achieved by setting all weights to 1, while with specific
weight for each vertex we obtain the operating costs
(which we obtained from [19]; see Section V-B). Note
that the delay and the cost values are in arbitrary units,
and only their ratios between the aircraft is relevant.
We computed the Pareto frontier with respect to our
two objectives (Pareto frontier consists of non-dominated
solutions, i.e., those for which one objective cannot be
improved without deteriorating the other). Figures 4 and
5 show the results for the two ATM test cases.
We also computed the values for the two objectives
(for the same graphs) for 20 random orders and FCFS
time slot attribution. In the first test case, FCFS leads
to average delay of 1423.9 (minimum found FCFS delay
was 1389) and an average total cost of 4959.5 (minimum
found FCFS total cost was 4712). In the second test case
an average delay of 1416 (with a minimum value of 1366)
and an average total cost of 4450.8 (with a minimum
value of 4256.2) were obtained. For both cases, both the
delay and the cost are worse than every point of the
Pareto frontier (out of bounds of the axes to plot on the
figures).
Fig. 4. Pareto frontier for ATM Case 1
Fig. 5. Pareto frontier for ATM Case 2
For UTM, we considered only one objective (the total
cost of the deconfliction), which was 1788 and 1791
in UTM Case 1 and UTM Case 2 respectively. For 20
random orders, FCFS leads to average costs at 8830.55
(min=3701) and 9430.85 (min=3661) respectively, which
confirms sum coloring approach outperforms FCFS is all
tested cases.
VII. PAYMENT MECHANISM DESIGN FOR UTM
In this section we study design of a payment mecha-
nism for conflict resolution in UTM. A market-based eco-
nomic mechanism specifies how to allocate the resources
and how much every user has to pay for the allocation.
One important property of a mechanism is Social Opti-
mality: the resource allocation should maximize benefit
to the society. In our case, this amounts to finding the
optimal solution to the weighted MSCP (as described
above). The difficulty here is that in order to compute the
optimum, we need to know the value of time (WV) for
each drone v. However, if we ask for this value directly,
the drone operator could give a value higher than reality
to be favored by the algorithm. A truthful (or Incentive
Compatible) mechanism enforces the payments that in-
centivize the users to report wv truthfully (see [11] for
application of truthful mechanisms in ATM). The other
two mechanism properties which may be desirable in
applications are Individual Rationality (each user benefits
from participating in the market) and Budget Balance (the
resource owner’s net profit is 0).
A classical result in economics implies that no mech-
anism can possess the four properties at the same time
[22], and thus at least one of them has to be left out.
In our case, we forgo the Budget Balance, and use the
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism to determine the
payments for the users (VCG is essentially the only so-
cially optimal truthful individually rational mechanism
[23]). In VCG, the payments of user v is the ”harm” that
the user brings to the society, i.e., the difference between
the social welfare of the others in the presence of v and




cvj wj − ∑
j∈V\{v}
cV\{v}j wj (7)
, where cVv is the color allocated to v by the VCG
mechanism when deconflicting the drones in the set V.
With this payment, the total amount of money invested
to make the flight for v is pv + wvcv. Note that Budget
Balance is not met with this mechanism because all
drone operators are paying to the mechanism. If one
were to reach budget balance, drones surrendering good
layers to others would have to receive reimbursement
(be paid by the mechanism); this, however, could create
problems, such as incentivizing people to fly drones with
the only purpose of selling their slot.
Figure 6 shows the mean cost of a flight as a function
of the number of drones flying during one hour. Each
point on the figure is the average of 5 runs of the
traffic simulation, with r = 100m as the separation loss
distance. The weighted MSCP was solved with a greedy
algorithm (the last instances are too big to compute the
exact solution) on a computer with an Inter(R) Core(TM)
i7-4720HQ 2.60GHz CPU nodes and 8 Go RAM. One
immediate conclusion is that the denser the traffic, the
more expensive drone flying gets. Thus, VCG gives
a means of capacity regulation, as some flights may
become discouraged from flying by the payments.
Figure 7 shows the cost of the flight against the FCFS
strategy. Note that even though FCFS does not involve
any payments (the cost of the flight is only wvcv), the
FCFS costs are visibly higher than in the VCG mecha-
nism (where the cost is pv + wvcv).
Fig. 6. Average cost of a drone flight
Fig. 7. Average cost of a drone flight under VCG and FCFS
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We explored the use of sum coloring for strategic
deconfliction in ATM and UTM. For the former, we con-
sidered two goals (minimizing total delay and total cost)
and computed Pareto optimal solutions with respect to
the two objective functions. For the latter we focused on
only one objective (minimizing the total cost) and stud-
ied the performance of agent-based truthful economic
mechanism. Both in ATM and UTM our solutions work
remarkably better than the FCFS allocation.
One limitation of our approach is that in ATM practice
several other aspects should be taken into account: giv-
ing a higher priority to planes in an emergency situation
or low on fuel, favoring ground holding for planes still
on the ground, considering the rerouting possibilities
depending on the sector, etc. For UTM, our formulation
permits the use of an unlimited number of layers. Even
though our socially optimal solution tends to have a
nearly-minimum number of colors, in reality there will
be an upper bound on the number of available layers,
depending on the airspace division, drones altimetry
capabilities, noise concerns, etc.
Another limitation of our methods is that they assume
to solve all the conflicts. However, real-time adjustments
would be probably necessary because of trajectories
uncertainties and unexpected events (such as wind or
other meteorological conditions, systems failure, etc.).
Our goal is to reduce the conflicts as much as possible
and to decrease operating costs.
Last but not least, the computing time to get the pay-
ments in the VCG mechanism grows with the number
of drones involved, which can become an issue if the
instances are too big. As a remedy, a sliding window and
a division of the airspace into sectors would probably
be required. Future work could take this into account
and divide the airspace into sectors to improve the
robustness of the deconfliction. Our allocation method
could also be combined with other conflict resolution
schemes to make it more efficient.
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